

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 IO-13 ACDA-07 ISO-00 DHA-02 OMB-01 TRSE-00
CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-01 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00
NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 MC-02
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R 251123Z JUN 77
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9128
DIA WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USMISSION NATO
USDEL MBFR VIENNA
USDEL SALT II GENEVA
CINCEUR//J2
USNMR SHAPE BELGIUM
CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 MOSCOW 9164

ATTENTION DIA, SEE PARA 7 FOR IR FORMAT DATA

E.O. 11652: GDS 31 DEC 83
TAGS: PFOR, PARM, MBFR, SALT, UR, US
SUBJECT: SOVIET COMMENTATORS ON DETENTE, SALT, MBFR, CSCE, ETC

REF: IR 6 901 0623 77
SUMMARY: ROBERT KENNEDY, A FACULTY MEMBER AT THE US ARMY WAR

COLLEGE, HAD A SERIES OF DISCUSSIONS WITH SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY
EXPERTS DURING A RECENT VISIT IN MOSCOW. HIS EXCHANGES WITH IUSAC
DIRECTOR G.A. ARBATOV AND MEMBERS OF HIS STAFF AND IZVESTIYA
COMMENTATOR, M. MATVEYEV PROVIDED, FOR THE MOST PART, RATHER STAN-
DARD SOVIET LINES REGARDING THEIR DOUBTS ABOUT THE FUTURE OF
DETENTE, DISPLEASURE WITH RECENT AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, PARTI-
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CULARLY IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS AREA, AND ALLEGATIONS THAT THE US IS
UNDERTAKING ARMS PROGRAMS (MARK 12A, CRUISE MISSILES) AIMED AT
ATTAINING STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY OVER THE SOVIET UNION. SOME OF
THE SOVIETS WERE ALSO CRITICAL OF THE VANCE VISIT SALT PROPOSALS,
DISAPPOINTED WITH THE US FAILURE TO ACCEPT THE WARSAW PACT NO
NUCLEAR FIRST USE PROPOSAL AND EXPRESSED THE BELIEF THAT PROGRESS
IN MBFR IS LARGELY CONTINGENT ON SUCCESS IN SALT, ARBATOV CLAIMED

THAT DEF MIN D.F. USTINOV IS SENSITIVE TO STRATEGIC STABILITY QUESTIONS AND WOULD BE CAPABLE OF OVERCOMING ANY MILITARY RESISTANCE TO ARMS REDUCTIONS AGREED TO IN SALT. END SUMMARY.

1. MR. ROBERT KENNEDY, STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE, US ARMY WAR COLLEGE, WAS IN MOSCOW 11-15 JUNE 1977. DURING THAT TIME HE HAD MEETINGS WITH SEVERAL SOVIETS INCLUDING G.A. ARBATOV, DIRECTOR, IUSAC; V. BOGDANOV, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, IUSAC; G.A. TROFIMENKO, CHIEF FOREIGN POLICY DEPT, AND M. MATVEYEV, POLITICAL COMMENTATOR, IZVESTIYA, THE PRINCIPLE POINTS TOUCHED ON IN HIS DISCUSSIONS ARE SUMMARIZED BELOW.

2. KENNEDY REPORTS THAT IUSAC DIRECTOR ARBATOV MADE THE FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS IN THE COURSE OF HIS CONVERSATION WITH THE AMERICAN VISITOR.

- EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION'. 09)8:83
592ARD THE SOVIET UNION ESPECIALLY WITH REGARD TO HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE BROWING "US EFFORT TO ATTAIN "SOME KIND OF STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY" OVER THE SOVIET UNION AS EVIDENCED IN AMERICAN CRUISE MISSILE AND MARK 12A WARHEAD PROGRAMS

- ASSERTED THAT THIS AMERICAN PROGRAM TO MODIFY ITS STRATEGIC MISSILES WOULD NOT HAVE UNDERTAKEN BY NIXON OR KISSINGER WHO HAD PROMISED RESTRAINT IN THIS AREA.

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-- CLAIMED THAT WHILE THE US IS "CLEARLY SEEKING STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY", IT IS INCONCEIVABLE THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD DO SO, HAVING AGREED TO SETTLE FOR STRATEGIC PARITY DURING SALT I. IN THIS REGARD, HE JUSTIFIED THE CURRENT SOVIET ICBM PROGRAM AS HAVING BEEN IN THE MILL FOR SOME TIME.

-- CLAIMED THAT "SOME MEASURES OF MILITARY PARITY" CURRENTLY EXISTS IN EUROPE AND THAT WESTERN PREPONDERANCE IN ANTI-TANK WEAPONRY (WHOSE IMPORTANCE WAS DEMONSTRATED IN THE OCT 73 WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST) IS SUFFICIENT TO OFFSET ANY SOVIET ADVANTAGES IN ARMORED VEHICLES.

- EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT A POSSIBLE BUILD UP OF CRUISE MISSILES IN WESTERN EUROPE IN LIGHT OF CHANGES IN SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS WHICH MAKES THE SOVIET UNION EXTREMELY CONCERNED ABOUT THE FUTURE OF DETENTE.

- RESPONDED TO A QUESTION ABOUT POSSIBLE SOVIET MILITARY OPPOSITION TO ANY REDUCTIONS IN SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCE POSTURE BY NOTING THAT A CIVILIAN, D.F. USTINOV, WHO IS "KNOWLEDGEABLE ON PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH INTERNATIONAL STABILITY", LEADS THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND THUS A SALT AGREEMENT BRINGING SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS

ON BOTH SIDES COULD NOT BE BLOCKED BY THE MILITARY BUREAUCRACY.

3. IUSAC DEPUTY DIRECTOR BOGDANOV'S COMMENTS TO KENNEDY INCLUDED:

-CHARGE THAT LATEST ROUND OF WEAPONS IMPROVEMENTS INDICATES US
DESIRE TO END DETENTE AND REGAIN SOME MEASURE OF STRATEGIC
SUPERIORITY,

-EXPRESSION OF DISPLEASURE ABOUT BOTH THE CONTENT AND MANNER
OF PRESENTATION OF THE VANCE MARCH SALT II PROPOSALS.

- CALL FOR ACCEPTANCE OF THE VLADIVOSTOK ACCORDS AS THE BASIS
OF A SALT II AGREEMENT WHOSE CONCLUSION IS IMPORTANT TO MAINTAIN
THE IMPETUS ACHIEVED IN SALT I.

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- CALLED FOR A SALT II BAN ON CRUISE MISSILES ABOVE 600 KM
RANGE, ALTHOUGH HE ADMITTED THAT HE FEELS ONE CANNOT VERIFY LIMIS
ON SLCM'S AND GLCM'S SINCE THEY CAN EASILY BE HIDDEN. ALSO VIWS
CRUISE MISSILES AS POTENTIALLY AN IMPORTANT THEATER NUCLEAR
DELIVERY SYSTEM.

- ON MBFR, CITED EASTERN DATA TABLED IN VIENNA AS CLEARLY
DEMONSTRATING APPROXIMATE EAST-WEST EQUALITY OF MANPOWER IN THE
NGA SINCE THE APPARENT DISPARITY IS ONLY 20,000 MEN.

- CLAIMED ANY SOVIET ADVANTAGE IN TANKS IN CENTRAL EUROPE IS
OFFSET BY COMBINATION OF STOCKPILED US TANKS AND WESTERN ANTI-
TANKCAPABILITIES.

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CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-01 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00

NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 MC-02

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R 251123Z JUN 77

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9129
DIA WASHDC
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4. IUSAC FOREIGN POLICY SECTION HEAD G.A. TROFIMENKO'S REMARKS INCLUDED:

- CRITICISM OF AMERICAN SALT II PROPOSAL TO LIMIT QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENTS IN ICBM'S AS AN ATTEMPT TO GAIN UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE FOR THE US SINCE THE USSR IS CURRENTLY IN THE MIDST OF AN ICBM MODERNIZATION PROGRAM.

- REPEATEDLY DENIED THE POSSIBILITY THAT EITHER THE US OR SOVIET UNION COULD EVER ATTAIN A PRECLUSIVE FIRST STRIKE CAPABILITY SINCE "DEVASTATING RETALIATION" WILL ALWAYS AWAIT THE ATTACKER. EVEN IF THE US ICBM FORCE IS EVENTUALLY THREATENED, THE OTHER STRATEGIC SYSTEMS, SLBMS AND BOMBERS, WILL REMAIN "RELATIVELY INVULNERABLE".
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- NEVERTHELESS, CHARACTERIZED US STRATEGIC FORCE IMPROVEMENTS WHICH HE ATTRIBUTED TO THE "INEVITABLE DRIVE OF THE PENTAGON FOR NEW WEAPONS", AS THREATENING TO THE SOVIETS.

- WAS GENERALLY PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE FUTURE OF ARMS CONTROL AND CONVINCED THAT SUCCESS AT SALT WOULD BE REQUIRED TO ATTAIN ANY PROGRESS IN MBFR OR ADDITIONAL CBM'S AT THE BELGRADE CSCE FORUM.

5. ISVESTIYA POLITICAL COMMENTATOR MATVEYEV REPORTEDLY MADE THE FOLLOWING REMARKS.

- SOVIET ASSURED RETALIATION CAPABILITY MADE MORE DIFFICULT BY US ICBM IMPROVEMENTS INCLUDING THE NEW MINUTEMAN WARHEAD, (MARK 12A) WHICH HE CHARACTERIZED AS NOT A SALT II BARGAINING PLOY BUT A REFLECTION OF THE AMERICAN DESIRE TO IMPROVE ICBM ACCURACY.

- US DEVELOPING CRUISE MISSILES AS A FOURTH LEG OF ITS STRATEGIC POSTURE. HOWEVER, HIS "REAL CONCERN" CENTERED ON ITS POSSIBLE

INTRODUCTION INTO THE EUROPEAN THEATER.

- LITTLE HOPE FOR PROGRESS AT MBFR UNTIL THE "PARAMOUNT" STRATEGIC ISSUES ARE RESOLVED IN A SALT II AGREEMENT, WHICH MAY NOT BE ACHIEVED BEFORE THE OCTOBER EXPIRATION OF THE IA. NEVERTHELESS, THE 9 SOVIET-AMERICAN WORKING GROUPS MIGHT YIELD IMPROVED BILATERAL RELATIONS.

- AMBIVALENT ON POSSIBILITY OF APPROVING ADDITIONAL CBM'S AT BELGRADE SINCE THESE ARE VIEWED BY THE SOVIETS AS "SECONDARY MEASURES" AND IT REQUIRED A "GREAT CONCESSION" BY THE SECRECY-CONSCIOUS SOVIET MILITARY TO AGREE TO THEM IN THE FINAL ACT.

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- CURRENT STATE OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS NOT CONDUCIVE TO NEW AGREEMENTS DUE TO THE "PROVOCATIVE" CARTER HUMAN RIGHTS INITIATIVES WHICH MAY BE DUE TO THE INFLUENCE OF BRZEZINSKI, AND THE PRESIDENT'S "TOTALLY NEGATIVE" RECENT SUBMISSION TO THE CONGRESS ON CSCE.

-SOVIET LARGE ICBMS ARE A REFLECTION OF THE STATE OF SOVIET WARHEAD TECHNOLOGY AND ANY REDUCTIONS IN THEIR NUMBERS WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO BE LINKED TO IMPROVEMENTS IN THIS TECHNOLOGY WHICH WOULD PERMIT SMALLER ICBMS TO CARRY THE SAME NUMBER OF WARHEADS.

- CRITICIZED THE US FOR NOT ACCEPTING THE WARSAW PACT NO-NUCLEAR FIRST USE PROPOSAL OF LAST NOV.

- SPOKE FAVORABLY OF RECENT ALTON FRYE PROPOSALS (TO BE PUBLISHED SOON IN FOREIGN POLICY) THAT MILITARY STABILITY MIGHT BE ENHANCED BY COORDINATING US AND SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINES.

- REGARDING A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN, MATVEYEV SPOKE OF SOVIET DESIRE TO MAINTAIN LEEWAY FOR PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS.

COMMENT

6. THE OBSERVATIONS OF THESE KNOWLEDGEABLE OBSERVERS PROVIDE ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE OF SOVIET CONCERN ABOUT THE FUTURE OF SOVIET-AMERICAN DETENTE IN THE FACE OF CURRENT US FOREIGN POLICY ESPECIALLY IN THE AREA OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE AMERICAN EFFORT TO IMPROVE ITS DEFENSE CAPABILITY WHICH THEY CHARACTERIZE AS AN EFFORT TO REGAIN STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY. ON SALT II, THEIR COMMENTS OFFER LITTLE THAT IS NEW, ALTHOUGH ARBATOV'S CLAIM THAT DEF MIN USTINOV IS INFORMED ABOUT STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS AND CAPABLE OF OVERCOMING ANY POSSIBLE MILITARY RESISTANCE TO REDUCTIONS IN SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES IS INTRIGUING.

7. CONFIDENTIAL. THIS IS IR NO 6 901 0647 77, 1. USSR (UR)

2. 6 901 0647 77, 3. SOVIETS COMMENT ON DETENTE, SALT, MBFR,
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CSCE ETC. 4. NA 5. 770613-770615, 6. 770624, 7. 770614,
MOSCOW USSR, 8. ICR/ C-SR6-40034/ CONTINUES, CIR: 2A1A(3)
B,C, 9000/CONTINUES, 9. B-2, 10. USDAO MOSCOW USSR (ARMA) (AIRA)
, 11.,
12. GRAHAM D. VERNON, COL, USA, ARMA, EDWARD L. WARNER, MAJ,
USAF, AAIRA, WILLIAM D. HALLORAN, MAJ, USA, AARAMA,
13. JAMES W. WOLD, BRIG GEN, USAF, DATT
14. VISITING US OFFICIAL, 15. NON-DIRC. GDS 83.
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Message Attributes

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Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 25-Jun-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
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Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
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Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
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Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2031574
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: SOVIET COMMENTATORS ON DETENTE, SALT, MBFR, CSCE, ETC
TAGS: PFOR, PARM, UR, US, MBFR, (KENNEDY, ROBERT), (ARBATOV, G A), (MATVEYEV, M)
To: STATE DIA
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/9fd57e76-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
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